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Abstract 
The provocative paper by John Forrester: ‘If p, Then What? Thinking in 
Cases’ (1996) opened up the question of case thinking as a separate mode 
of reasoning in the sciences.  Case-based reasoning is certainly endemic 
across a number of sciences, but it has looked different according to where 
it has been found.  This paper investigates this mode of science - namely 
thinking in cases - by questioning the different interpretations of ‘If p?’ and 
exploring the different interpretative responses of what follows in ‘Then 
What?’.  The aim is to characterise how ‘reasoning in, within, with, and 
from cases’ forms a mode of scientific investigation for single cases, for runs 
of cases, and for comparative cases, drawing on materials from a range of 
different fields in which case-based reasoning appears.   
 
 
1. Reframing the Question?    
1.1 John Forrester’s ‘Thinking in Cases’  
John Forrester offers us several historical starting points for what constitutes 
thinking in cases.  One of the main historical roots he picks out is the medical 
case history or the administrative case file: the written materials enclosed inside 
the case, which can be opened for reasoning and analysis using those same 
documents.  In this framing, reasoning in the case is focussed on reasoning with 
those materials inside the box.  Second, JF recognises an historical strand 
                                                          
∗ I thank the Wolfson Foundation, whose grant funded my Wolfson/British Academy Research 
Professorship for ‘Rethinking Case Studies in the Social Sciences’ which first gave me the time to 
consider the myriad of forms of case-based knowledge making in the sciences.  I thank also the 
many people who have helped me develop these ideas about ‘thinking in cases’ over the years; 
and I especially mention the Princeton project on Science Without Laws (2007): editors: Norton 
Wise, Angela Creager and Liz Lunbeck, and participant Rachel Ankeny.  Particularly for this 
paper, I thank Brian Hurwitz (whose discussions prompted this analysis); Sharon Crasnow (for 
her close reading and many helpful points); Kim Hajek who has recently widened my 
appreciation of ‘the text’; and of course, the late John Forrester, with whom intellectual 
engagement was always both immensely and enjoyable rewarding.   
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coming from legal reasoning, legal cases (and by historical association, business 
school cases), where thinking in cases is focussed on bringing all the disparate 
elements and materials into some kind of a colligation in order to come to a 
conclusion about the relevant particular claims that are exhibited there, and 
thus to recognise which principles (legal principles or precedents) that come from 
outside the case should be applied in thinking within the specific case.  These 
two historical roots of thinking in cases, with their different connotations, can be 
seen as broadly related to social scientists’ notion of ‘case studies’, the gathering 
together of a wide range of materials on a specific situation or event for analysis 
(as opposed to a smaller range of evidence on lots of separate events or situations 
as in statistics).1   For me their significance lies in the clues they have provided 
to the process of developing a satisfactory case study in the first place, and both 
strands can be seen as thinking within the case.2  Except for the common law 
tradition, neither of these historical roots have much to offer in reasoning beyond 
the individual case to say something about other cases, nor for reasoning beyond 
a run of cases, although any argument which takes the form: ‘If p? Then What?’ 
seems to invite such considerations. 
 
Significantly, Forrester also points to a strand on thinking in cases as the 
opposite of applying general laws - ie it is rather about thinking in/with 
particulars.  He cites John Stuart Mill’s discussion of situations in which 
inductive logic forms the basis for deductive logic.  I take this inductive-
deductive loop up below, not so much for the inductive/deductive chain, but for 
two other reasons.  First because it offers insight into examples where we have 
a run of cases; and secondly because it provides an example of one way (but not 
the only way) that case-based thinking involves thinking from cases and moving 
beyond them (as Forrester surely believed possible), rather than within them. 
   
                                                          
1 Social scientists differ in how they describe case study work, but for a definition of case studies 
that seems to work across the social sciences, see Morgan, 2012, 
2 For problems of constructing cases out of different elements and the configuring processes 
involved, see Morgan, 2017. 
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My interests are less in the historical roots of case thinking (though I appreciate 
their importance in places that pop up below) than in the reasoning that goes on 
in developing and using such case materials.   Forrester put this broader 
question on the map when he suggested that ‘thinking in cases’ should be the 
seventh style of thinking or practical reasoning in science to join the six styles 
outlined by Crombie (1988, 1994) and Hacking (1992).  But he forbore to outline 
that mode, except in his own exemplary case work, where, as Phillips (2017) 
suggests, he proposed that ‘A case hold, confines, protects and travels; it also 
categorizes and exemplifies.’ (2017, p xv).  Yes indeed, but how does it do all 
those things?  We may get from the historical roots that cases hold, confine and 
protect, but what are the purposes or outcomes of its travel, what is being 
categorized by a case and what exemplified, and for what purposes?  And are 
these characteristics and uses specific to the field that Forrester worked in or do 
they have wider writ?  The aim here is to locate these aspects, and the wider 
functions found in other examples of case reasoning, in order to develop an 
account that fits not just to reasoning within the case, but more significantly 
reasoning from the case and from its materials in such ways that prompt various 
kinds of legitimate knowledge beyond the case itself.  My analysis therefore 
seeks to answer the question: if this is a seventh mode of scientific practical 
reasoning, what does it consist of and how should it be characterised? 
 
1.2 On where to put the question marks in Forrester’s ‘If p, Then What’ 
In order to broaden this enquiry into the nature and range of modes of case-
based thinking, I begin by questioning where to put a question mark in 
Forrester’s (1996) title.  Rather than his ‘If p, Then What?’, one option is ‘If p? 
Then What?’, another is ‘If p? Then What’, or even ‘If p, Then What’.  In 
problematizing where the question marks go, I expect to open a path into the 
different kinds of case-based reasoning that go on in the human and social 
sciences.  Since the point of this enquiry is to chase different kinds of thinking 
in cases, I will range across a number of fields where problematizing the 
question mark offers an entry key to what ‘thinking in cases’ involves.  I will 
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begin Forrester’s own field, and with the two sciences that are most closely 
aligned with thinking about being human and being social and that rely on the 
study of single cases, namely psychiatry in comparison with anthropology.  I will 
then move onto the use of runs of cases: first in a field that, in appearance, looks 
least like anthropology and psychiatry, namely mathematics, and then back into 
the closer field of medicine.  Considering comparative case work takes me back 
to social sciences especially sociology and social science history.  The aim here is 
not to pin down the behaviour of different fields, but rather to elucidate these 
three types of case based reasoning by looking particularly at scientists who offer 
reflexive accounts of their case thinking, or for which/whom there are associated 
commentaries by historians of science such as Forrester. 
 
 
2. Thinking in Single Cases  
2.1 The (stand-in) psychiatrist vs the anthropologist; John vs Clifford 
John Forester’s framing for thinking in cases can best be understood not just 
from his classic paper ‘If p, Then What?’ (1996) but from his iconoclastic ‘The 
Psychoanalytic Case’ (2007, and which reappeared in his Thinking in Cases, 
2017). This latter starting point enables reflective comparisons between 
Forrester’s analysis of one of Stoller’s psychiatry case histories and Clifford 
Geertz’s (1972) account of Balinese cock-fighting - for their attitudes and their 
accounts share much in common.  Of course Forrester is not Stoller, but his 
writing is so closely engaged with the latter’s psychiatric mission that I am 
treating him as a ‘stand-in’, a position I suspect he would not have objected to.  
For both Forrester and Geertz, there are question marks at every point: ‘If p?, 
Then What?’ is an unending sequence of asking and answering little or bigger 
questions as the human/social scientist gets drawn into the case and tries to 
make sense of it.  The sequence is connected, one question leads to another, or 
perhaps back round to previous ones - pointing to the importance of both figuring 
out the next ‘If p?’ and then posing possible answers in the ‘Then What?’.   
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Both scholars, in the words of Forrester’s subtitle ‘thinking in cases’, wrote 
programmatically about case-based science.  Geertz (1973), in writing about the 
approach of the anthropologist to the society that formed her/his case of study, 
described the anthropologist as being faced with a knot of puzzles in the society 
s/he studies.  His role, he argued, is not just to untie those knots, but to ravel 
the elements back up into an analysis of the culture of that society.3 He thinks 
about a society’s culture within that society’s terms and analyses that within the 
terms of his own understanding: he thinks within the case.  This un-puzzling 
and ravelling up process is his role as social scientist; and his process account is 
paralleled in the way Forrester recounts the psychiatrist’s (namely Stoller’s), 
analysis and his case history.  For the latter, what is being unravelled 
(analysed) and ravelled up (interpreted) is the patient’s experience.  Forrester 
also shares Geertz’s attachment to ‘thick description’.4 Geertz uses this 
expression not to mean exhaustive description, but analysed description: 
description in which ideas and theorizing are brought into the case to make 
sense of it (as with legal cases), for his ambition for case thinking is to generalize 
within the case, a mode of thinking and reasoning that he takes to be 
characteristic of clinical medicine.  But where Geertz explicitly warned against 
generalisations going outside or beyond the case, Forrester’s view of Stoller is 
that he does indeed aim to go beyond the case.  According to Forrester, Stoller is 
ravelling up an analysis inside the case that will reach toward something more 
general about the behaviour of human beings that can move outside the case.  
This critical difference between thinking within, and reasoning with or from, 
captures the point about how materials established within one case or case study 
may be utilised in reasoning from that cases to other individual cases, or to a 
generic level (a topic I return to later).  
 
 
                                                          
3 See Morgan, 2017 on the importance of resolving those puzzles as the key to narrative 
explanation offered in case research.  
4 This is according to the introduction by Adam Phillips to Forrester (2017, p xiv). 
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2.2 Insider-outsider considerations 
There is something unusual about the way that scientists from these two fields 
think within the case - both are active as scientists inside their own cases.  They 
are human and social animals researching what it is to be human and social, and 
so being ‘resident’ (Kohler’s term) they chose a level of participation which affects 
their writing about the case with respect to the reader.5  Geertz, the 
anthropologist is, as befits his profession, ‘a participant observer’. 6 This entails 
that he must take part to the extent he must show the reader he was really 
there, and in the middle of the community not just watching from the sidelines - 
for the credibility and authority of his account rest on his admitted presence.  In 
one respect, he is like Simmel’s (1908/50) ‘stranger’ in the community, but unlike 
that ‘stranger’, the outsider who comes to stay but remains a stranger, the 
anthropologist goes away again.  Simmel’s ‘stranger’ is a cultural confidant, a 
kind of situated observer who has the capacity to reflect back onto the village 
something of how they appear to the outsider.7  The anthropologist also has 
such a reflective role, but it is more active than the stranger’s: this is the 
translator’s role proposed for sociology by Stephen Turner (1980) but - 
importantly - it is not (by intention) to translate that community of study back 
onto themselves, but rather to a different, outsider, community as represented by 
the scientist.  The sociologist does not just reflect, or even just report, his 
observations, but rather explains the situation to those other outsider 
communities and cultures who read her/his work; this is a one-way translating 
role, and the reader is a quasi-participant observer not just to the society but to 
his analysis. The anthropologist is more actively involved in the community than 
                                                          
5 Kohler’s (2019) accounts of ‘resident science’: science in the field, covers cases from 
anthropology, sociology, field primatology and field ecology.    
6 By comparison, for example, in medical cases, the scientists would not say that they were 
involved in participant observation, though they are often present in making observations and 
interacting with their case participants.   
7 This is kin-related to the standpoint theory of feminist theory because of the different 
communities involved, but Simmel’s stranger remains a non-judgmental outsider, and so does not 
carry implications of difference in authority or status between the observer and those observed.  
See also Linstrum (2019) in the context of colonial classification, and Merton’s (1972) insider-
outsider account at the level of groups.   
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most of Kohler’s ‘resident’ observers whose situation always enables them to 
observe, but who may (or may not, depending upon their scientific discipline) 
interact via participation or confiding.  The anthropologist is at one and the 
same time an insider and an outsider, insider in the case, but outsider as a social 
scientist in reasoning about the case and for an outside audience.   
 
In the psychiatric case history, as depicted by Forrester, the analyst narrator 
plays not just the confessional role, but the role of gentle extortionist in order to 
draw materials out of the patient for analysis.8 It is a process of co-production, 
with the patient inching toward self-knowledge and the analyst inching toward 
an analysis, and, in Stoller’s case (as picked apart by Forrester), toward 
developing broader theoretical and conceptual claims out of the case.  The 
analyst too is an insider and outsider, but there are critical difference in the 
performance of these roles compared to the anthropologist.  Stoller translates 
from his field knowledge to the patient in providing his analysis and treatment, 
but also translates it for the reader. If the analyst did not report his presence, 
there would be no case history, but those case histories that are made public are 
presumably designed to show off not just the analyst’s skills, but their creative 
theorizing about the psyche of the patient.  In such case histories, the reader of 
the text is drawn in as participant, more collusively than the reader of Geertz’s 
account because their participation is not explicit but instead voyeuristic, not 
just of the patient but also of the analyst’s reasoning (as Forrester well 
recognised in his subtitle for his account of Stoller’s case, 2017).9  Of course, the 
anthropologist writes for her/his community of readers, and if they are to follow 
her/his analysis, s/he needs to share her/his evidence in constructing the case 
account and to share their reasoning about the case. But where the 
anthropologist explains an ‘other’ society to her/his community of readers not 
back to the society s/he studies, the psychoanalyst ‘explains’ (perhaps) their 
patient’s situation (perhaps) directly to that patient, and to their reader.   
                                                          
8 For the relation of the analyst and patient in reasoning within a case, see also Hajek (2019) 
9 See Böhmer (2019) for a discussion of the public nature of such case accounts. 
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For both fields, the participant observation status has implications for what it 
means to reason within the case - ‘If p? Then What?’ - and for how that reasoning 
is shared to bring others (outsiders) inside the case.  
 
 
3. Runs of Cases 
Medicine and mathematics and medicine are rarely put into the same box, and 
mathematics is rarely considered a human science, but any field whose activities 
has depended (historically) primarily on the capacities of the human brain can 
surely be considered such.  Both medicine and mathematics, in certain sites, 
rely on runs of cases - which accounts for their presence together here, although 
their usage of such cases is rather different.  Of course runs, sets, and sequences 
of cases are likely to be found in other scientific sites too (as I suggest later in an 
example from political science).  Here is where the possibilities of ‘If p, Then 
What’ offer scope for thinking more broadly about the natures of case-based 
thinking.   
 
3.1 Inductions and conjectures  
I begin with mathematics, and with two possibilities: either ‘If p, Then X 
Follows’, or ‘If p? Then X Follows?’.  But I end by suggesting that we may also 
need ‘If p, Then What X Follows?’.  That is, I problematize the practices in some 
examples of case thinking found in mathematical reasoning in terms of that 
phrase.   
 
In some examples of mathematical argument, ‘If p’ means ‘We Assume p’ so the 
‘If’ is conventional rather than meaningful (though of course this is not so in all 
domains, eg probability theorizing).  In deductive reasoning, whatever is 
supposed to follow from that assumption does indeed follow, so the argument 
seems cut and dried: p holds, so then X follows.  For example, when we know we 
have a case of a right angle triangle, we also know Pythagoras’ theorem holds, so 
we can offer some deductions.  But we can only deduce because we have that 
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theorem: thus ‘If p, Then X Holds’.  In this version of case-based reasoning, ‘If p’ 
means ‘Given p’, so p is not under issue, not subject to question, and other things 
follow from it with no question mark either.  It is the deductive standard. For 
example, in economics it might be something like: ‘assuming (if) people behave 
according the standardized economists’ definition of rationality, then, they will 
behave as follows when faced with a particular kind of circumstances (for 
example, they will chose in a particular order of preferences). 
 
But paradoxically, this kind of mathematical theorem that supports such 
deductive reasoning might have been historically developed in an inductive 
argument, putting it into that tradition for case thinking from many particulars 
which Forrester attributed to Mill.  Indeed, Reviel Netz’s (1999) account of the 
development of geometric proof in Greek mathematics suggests that such proofs 
did originate in this case-based manner.  Once we have a theorem, then we can 
use that general finding deductively, but deriving that theorem might depend, as 
Netz argued on a process of asking again and again, for each of many particular 
cases - each a separable, chosen point in the geometric space - ‘If This Particular 
p? Then What Follows?’.  Putting together the results of ‘If p? Then What?’ for 
all the individual points (cases), and showing that they all have the same result 
validates a generalisation that all the other relevant points (in the same domain, 
but not individually argued for) will have the same result, and so creates the 
possibility of a general argument that supports deductive claims for any further 
points within such a given realm covered by the set of case points.  This seems 
to be an inductive proof, a proof by boredom (for the reasoning for each case is 
the same and needs to show the same outcome) followed by a leap of faith or of 
plausible belief, that the same result will hold for all the other particular, but not 
yet chosen, relevant points, and so then the run of actual and supposed cases can 
be developed into a theorem.  
 
Mathematics is, in some ways the most human of sciences.  That mathematics 
offers the possibility of ‘proof by boredom’ is a manifestation of this claim, one 
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rather different from Descartes’ ‘I think, therefore I am’, which seems more 
relevant to a different way that runs of cases are used in mathematics.  One of 
the best known philosophy of science tracts on mathematics: Lakatos’s (1976) 
Proofs and Refutations, pointed out how informal the process of mathematical 
reasoning is.  His account of how mathematicians had reasoned about the 
relation of the number of vertices to sides to faces in polyhedra suggests 
something closer to the postulation and proof reasoning mode that Crombie and 
Hacking had marked down as first in their list of styles or kinds of scientific 
thinking or modes of reasoning (first because it was historically first, originating 
in ancient mathematics no doubt).  And the mode of reasoning in Lakatos’s 
account seems to follow just such a hypothesis-proof or rather conjecture-
refutation looping (rather than the inductive-deductive loop discussed by Netz 
which fitted so well to Mill’s inductive account).  Lakatos’s ‘rational 
reconstruction’ (supported by historical footnotes) presents a sequence of 
geometric figures with ever more faces and edges and vertices - that is a run of 
related cases rather than a run of similar cases as in Netz’s account.  The 
argument goes from one case of a geometric figure on to the next (slightly 
harder) case.  His reconstruction depends on the use of a set of examples and 
counter-examples, and with side-moves, indicating that those proof moves 
depend on reasoning through each specific case of polyhedra in the sequence.   
The relevant phrase for each case in the series should be ‘If P (as an 
assumption), Then What Follows?’ suggesting not a completely obvious deductive 
process, but rather that the outcome has to be carefully developed through each 
one in the sequence of successively more complex cases.  
 
3.2 Classifying and cases  
While the idea that mathematical reasoning is, in some sites, case based might 
seem provocative, it is a conventional claim that medicine has - in large part - 
been built on cases as attested by our historians of medicine, and flagged by 
Forrester in his paper.  Unlike the maths cases, in medical cases - nothing can 
be (easily) assumed, so both ‘If p’, and ‘Then What’ can be questioned, and in 
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different ways depending on the context.  Without pretending to be exhaustive, I 
look briefly at two contexts which depend on case-based thinking: recognising a 
new disease category, and individual patient diagnosis and treatment decisions.  
Both types of situation depend on runs of cases. This is particularly obvious in 
the first case, of defining a new category of disease, where several cases with the 
same characteristics will likely be needed in order for a new disease to be defined 
and labelled.  But when thinking about the individual patient and their 
diagnosis or treatment, that judgement depends on there being an already 
defined category of disease, P, and treatment T, against which individual 
patients’ diagnosis and subsequent treatments can be identified (see Ankeny, 
2007).  But these diagnostic and treatment regimes also depend on an earlier 
typical or index case, or set of cases, that create such an index case, which have 
defined the characteristics of P and its possible treatments T.10  
 
Defining a new disease category generally requires a run or series of cases, and 
investigating those cases to see which, within reason, can be grouped together 
such that whatever they have in common can be defined.  That is, a set of cases 
with some features in common are gradually pulled together, and the question is 
do these cases fit together to form a new class, a new disease category?  Here 
the ‘If p?’ asks: ‘Are these the same kind of p?’ where p is not yet fully defined or 
clarified.  Thus, this question about a new disease category differs from the 
patient diagnosis, and comes before it.  Once we have a run of cases that serve 
to characterise the phenomenon of a new disease P, from there, we can then 
recognise further cases of p when we meet them, and are in a position to 
recognise one p as a member of that class of P.  Rachel Ankeny (2011) recounts 
how defining HIV-AIDS involved a gradual grouping together of a set of 
individual cases by bringing in or noticing new characteristics and throwing out 
others that proved irrelevant, considering both personal and social 
                                                          
10 This points to the problem of approaching case-based thinking with the initial question ‘What 
is this a case of?’, a classifying question that only makes sense when the relevant typical 
phenomena has been established (see also Flexer (2019)).  This classifying move parallels the 
point about mathematical proofs - once we have the theorem, the case answer can be deduced.    
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characteristics of patients and their indicative symptoms.  That is, the 
characteristics of the disease did not become immediately recognised as evident 
in a set of cases, but emerged through considering a sequence of cases which at 
first sight seem to have little in common.  A parallel process (discussed by 
Ankeny 2014) occurred with the recent recognition that excess caffeine might be 
dangerous to the extent that it has now been remarked as a cause of death, and 
become an issue of interest to the American Centre for Disease Control.  The 
disease diagnosis here seems to have been not so difficult as a medical problem, 
but as a social problem of recognition.  In contrast, Brian Hurwitz’s (2014) 
account of the recognition of Parkinson’s disease tells of a much longer, perhaps 
life-long, attention of medical observation and attention that lead not just to 
recognising and defining that eponymous disease, but to provide a full account of 
its characteristics and progress.  
  
In medical diagnoses for the individual patient, certainly we need questions 
marks on both elements ‘If p? Then What?’.  But as Hurwitz (2017) points out, 
the question ‘If p?’ should be ‘Which p?’ for the diagnostic question is implicitly 
asking ‘Is it This p?’ or ‘That p?’, and maybe where ‘That p’ is not a single 
possibility but several; that is ‘If p?’ is really asking ‘Is it p1 or p2 or p3 or p4 
etc?’.  The diagnostic case question is asking ‘Which generic P is relevant in this 
particular case?’, where the case consists of the patient and their condition.  So 
the diagnostic question seeks to clarify the nature of the condition against 
several possible alternative conditions known or unknown with similar sets of 
characteristics.  (Indeed, the ‘If p’ can even refer to a symptom, not a disease 
class.)  ‘If it is this p1?’, then we would want to act in a relevant way.  ‘If it is 
that p2?’, then some other action is indicated.  Hurwitz shows how surprisingly 
simple, or uncertainly complex, a diagnostic problem might be in recounting 
medical cases that include a building worker with a nail through his foot; a nurse 
with sudden vision problems and headaches; a young woman who over a 
relatively short period of time had lost movement and control of her body; and so 
forth.   Patient diagnosis, it seems, is not a simple question even of ‘Which p?’ 
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but rather a question of given the case in front of us, how can we put together 
the information to reach recognition of ‘A possible p for this case’.  
 
Suppose the diagnosis has been made, so (as in the first maths case) ‘If p’ means 
‘Given p’ that is, we know the patient is diagnosed with p, then that part of the 
clause is no longer questioned.  That in turn indicates we know what the ‘Then 
What’ implies: it tells what treatment should follow and what the expected 
progress under that treatment should be.  While this seems straightforward, of 
course, it often turns out that the treatment, or its progress, is not so 
straightforward because of the combination of patient characteristics and variety 
of treatment options, which suggests that, after all, we still need the question 
mark on the ‘Then What?’.  Many patient case narratives (in the narrative 
medicine literature) are actually a narrative about this ‘Then What?’ experience, 
the treatment case.   
 
Of course, many (but by no means all) treatment regimens are now based on 
randomised control trials (RCTs) of treatments patients, but it is rarely 
recognised that these fundamentally involve a set of cases to which treatments 
have been administered under certain controls to extract information from that 
set of cases, each of which is an individual patient.  Each of these trials are 
themselves investigating an ‘If Treatment p? Then What?’  Since not all patients 
receive the treatment, there is a valid question mark on the first part of the 
clause.  And there is a question mark on the second since it is typical in 
medicine that the patient’s cases that are treated do not have exactly the same 
outcomes in response to treatments.  Treatment regimens and decisions based 
on RCT’s are based directly on the results of experiments on runs of cases, but 
they are based on something like the averages, or overall result, of the runs of 
cases, so that details of the individual cases disappear. 
 
These examples from medicine alert us to how using cases quickly runs into 
classifying activities, and into consideration of the factors underlying such 
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classifications, and we can find these same overlaps at work in other fields that 
use runs of cases.  For example, Sharon Crasnow (2012 and 2017) analyses how 
political scientists have addressed the ‘democratic peace hypothesis’ (that 
democracies don’t go to war with each other) by creating data sets consisting of a 
series of cases, with specific associated characteristics, in order to classify cases 
according to whether the main thesis holds or not in the set of cases overall.  
She also shows how such runs of cases are not sufficient to work out explanatory 
mechanisms, and how those scientists revert to more detailed individual case 
work in ‘process tracing’: tracing the mechanisms that might validate the thesis 
in one particular case, and from thence speak to the broader claims found in 
other particular cases, or even the bigger data set.  For political sciences there is 
no time-restriction: later cases can be used to shed light on earlier cases as well 
as earlier ones on later; and theoretical principles from the field might well be 
the promoter of similarity analyses.  
 
Such classifying work, in runs, sets, and sequences, of cases, depends upon 
recognising and framing similarities: between points in geometric space, between 
medical symptoms and diseases, between political events, all as part of ‘thinking 
in cases’.  Analysing such runs of similar cases offers possibilities for generating 
something considered more generic by the community, which could be a category 
of disease, the development of a mechanistic account, or the recognition of some 
more abstract claim or deductive proof.  These point back to Forrester’s account 
of the historical roots for the development of common law, a kind of law which 
relies on the recognition of common characteristics - that is of similarities - in a 
sequence of cases.  
  
These strands of reasoning within cases, and from cases - by the use of various 
kinds of comparative case thinking - are taken up again in section 5.    
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4. Thinking With and Beyond the Single Case 
Although medicine relies on a run of cases to define a disease category, and to 
underpin both diagnosis and treatments for patients, there are other fields in the 
historical and social sciences where a single case has been used to define 
something in such a way that it creates abstract or specific materials that can be 
used by others.  Such case reasoning initially involves thinking within cases, 
but may go on to generate thinking with cases or thinking from cases.    
 
It is important to recognise that thinking with cases and from cases does not 
mean suggesting that the case ‘generalises’, and indeed it is difficult to 
understand what ‘generalising’ from a case could mean in any literal way.  It 
certainly cannot mean ‘If p? Then wherever we find p, the same thing follows’.  
In this context, Znaniecki (quoted in Mitchell, 2006, p 34), makes a ‘nice’ 
distinction between generalising by an ‘enumerative induction’ from many cases 
with the same characteristics and findings, and ‘analytical induction’ which 
involves abstraction - the ability to abstract some essential finding from a 
concrete case which might then be, or presume to be, found relevant in other 
cases.  This captures the distinction between Mill’s induction from many 
particulars (and that we found in Netz’ account of Greek geometric proofs, and 
the examples in section 3 above) compared with the kinds of abstraction 
generalised from Athenian democracy or from the study of a slum society in 
Street Corner Society discussed here.  As I argued in Morgan, 2019 (and briefly 
summarise below), careful examination of the use of such exemplary cases 
(democratic Athens), and exemplary case studies (Street Corner Society), 
suggests that such analytical induction does indeed happen from case-based 
work: something potentially generic is identified, possibly at an abstract level, 
which is then found relevant elsewhere.11 I label such analytical inductions as 
thinking with cases.   
                                                          
11 See Morgan, 2017 and 2019 for the background to this distinction of exemplary cases and 
exemplary case studies, and the different characteristics of such case-based thinking, as well as 
the importance of the narrative in case-study accounts. 
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This attention to abstraction overlooks something at least as important, namely 
that the community of researchers often recognises the relevance of some specific 
elements of a case or case study (particular findings, materials, data, examples, 
explanations, variables of interest, even concepts, etc) as useful (see Morgan, 
2017).  These elements can be taken up for their own case work, or indeed, for 
some other mode of scientific investigation.  I label this inductive move thinking 
from cases. 
 
For example, we see both kinds of inductive moves - thinking with and from 
cases - in the case of Athenian democracy as discussed by Josh Ober (2007), an 
exemplary case which has been argued over again and again.  As he suggests, 
the case is rather like a model organism or model system - it has undergone long 
investigation and been used by both political theorists and political sociologists 
as well as by moral and political philosophers in arguments about the nature of 
democracy in its widest sense, that is, prompting analytical inductions in 
thinking with the case.  Such users may also carry the generic aspects of the 
case when thinking about other specific cases but also in more abstract or 
theoretical discussions of democracy, that is, thinking from the case.  Similarly, 
revolutions such as the French Revolution or the British Industrial Revolution 
continue to hold exemplary status as cases carrying generic elements that can be 
thought with, reinvestigated, re-framed, and from which ideas, generic 
characteristics, processes, outcomes can all carry freight into other cases for 
those communities who use them.  
 
We also see both kinds of inductive moves with an exemplary case study like 
Whyte’s Street Corner Society (1943).  This is not an exemplary case (the specific 
case was not seen as unusual or significant) but Whyte’s investigation and 
account gained exemplary status soon after its publication.  The case’s title 
became one of its main exports, gaining traction as a conceptual label developed 
in Whyte’s thinking with the case about a kind of society, a society of young men 
who hung out on street corners through lack of employment, house-hold space, 
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money and the where-with-all to do other things.  This is a good example for 
Znaniecki’s distinction, for the analytical induction here created an abstract 
label that gained wide currency, applied multiple times to many other cases and 
in many different scholarly communities suggesting that many others used the 
analytical induction that had involved thinking from the case.  At the same 
time, there was also a second kind of reasoning from the case, which became 
clear in following the path of where, how and when its details: methods, 
materials, vignettes, claims, and analyses were used by others.  A case study 
involves many things besides abstract claims and these elements can each be 
separately taken out and utilised elsewhere - from this case, to prompt a series of 
experiments on small group behaviour, to explain the relationship between 
mental health and social status, for theorizing social interactions, as evidence on 
attitudes to gambling in different communities, and so forth.   
 
What then are we to say about ‘If p, Then What?’ for such single cases and case 
studies.  When cases provide materials that are used by others in the 
community, the use-value can be of two kinds.  There is first the generic 
analytical inductive reasoning with cases - where the case develops and supports 
theoretical or generic claims as in Stoller’s account of human sexuality, or as in 
Whyte’s conceptual label for a kind of society (and in Becker’s account of ‘the 
fixer’ in sociology - see below).  Second, exemplary accounts are often also used 
in the community at much less generic level - that is their case materials prompt 
others to investigate other cases, to develop new lines of enquiry, or to ask new 
questions for consideration.  For this reasoning from cases, ‘If p, Then What?’ is 
a door opener not a door closer, it points from the case study (and its many 
concrete details and findings) not to the ‘Then What’ within the case, but to 
multiple ‘Then Whats’ beyond the case and in other cases. 
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5. Thinking Comparatively with Cases  
There are several ways in which social scientists depend on comparative case 
work to develop their ideas (though comparative work does not necessarily 
involve a commitment to cases as we see in 5.1 below).  Again, ‘If p, Then What?’ 
can be found in several form, and what is salient here is the attention paid to the 
differences as well as the similarities found between individual cases (as opposed 
to the similarities in runs of cases). 
 
5.1 Comparative history with cases 
There is a strong tradition in 20th century social science history that relies on 
comparative case work.  One of the most salient proponents of such comparative 
history, with a strong programmatic statement, was Marc Bloch (1928/53) who 
argued vehemently for a comparative history as a series of two-way comparisons 
between two different cases that were evidenced in different times, or in 
different places.  Given p was found in place X, prompted the question: was p 
also to be seen in place Y?  Given p occurred at time t, was p also available at 
time t+1 or t-1?  When p was caused by X here, did X also cause it there?  The 
‘Then What’ here is no longer what follows from ‘If p’ but rather the questions 
raised by the observation of p in one place and not in another.  Effectively, the 
‘If p’ is, like the assumptions of mathematicians, an already known p, and the 
‘Then What?’ offers new research horizons, pointing towards places to look for 
alternative materials prompted by the other case in the comparison.  This is the 
kind of work that social science historians do when they compare different 
specific cases of industrial revolution or financial crisis from different times or 
places (see Morgan 2019 for discussion).  Bloch argued that such carefully 
focussed comparisons, equally of similarity and difference, were a means of 
locating new evidence (previously hidden because not looked for) on phenomena, 
a way of challenging easy interpretations, and a means of developing 
explanations which avoided dead ends or pseudo causes (if X was a factor in case 
1, but not in case 2, then it was a pseudo-cause).  And these benefits would be 
for both cases in the comparison, the one already on the table and the new one 
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brought in, for knowledge of the base case would also be expanded.   
 
Bloch had in mind relatively bounded historical studies, enabling comparison to 
be specific and rooted in the particulars of those two times or places, so we can 
think of this comparative work as thinking within cases: learning more about 
each case, by thinking with them about other cases and enabling them to reflect 
back on themselves and each other.  Bloch had outlined the virtues of what 
global or economic historians later called ‘reciprocal comparison’ (see Austin, 
2007), though for these latter folks, both the sites, and the comparisons, were 
often so open ended that any sense of the boundedness of the case as a thinking 
unit disappears.  This is immediately evident when we consider comparative 
case work in the context of counterfactuals in social science history.   
 
When ‘If p’ refers to a counterfactual state, ie ‘If Not p?’, Forrester’s clause is 
asking ‘What would happen, or what would have happened, if p did not hold?’, 
for example ‘If there were no railways?, Then what would have followed?’.  
There are legitimate question marks on both parts of the clause.  First, the 
counterfactual ‘Not p?’ has to be very carefully specified and there are many 
ways to do this, so this is initially wide open to question.   It then becomes 
specified into a fixed ‘If not p’.  Second, there are many ways of filling in the 
‘What follows?’, so this will remain open to question.   
 
There is of course a huge literature on counterfactuals in philosophy, history, 
and social sciences, and while the basic idea of counterfactual reasoning depends 
on a comparison between two different situations, in real versus imagined 
worlds, nevertheless it is invalid to think of this as, in general, a mode of 
reasoning dependent upon, or characterised by, thinking in cases.  At one end, a 
counterfactual is understood and portrayed as an imagined thought experiment, 
which may range from the philosophers’ ‘imagine I have two left hands?’ to the 
immense historical scenarios that flow from imagining that China rather than 
the ‘West’ had become the world’s dominant economic and political power 
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(Tetlock, et al, 2006). To take just one example of the scenarios under that 
project: Kenneth Pomeranz’s (2006), ‘Without Coal? Colonies? Calculus?’ fills in 
the ‘Then What?’ clause by offering a series of scenarios which also change the ‘If 
Not p?’ at the same time, that is, involving not just ‘imagining an industrialized 
China and a non-industrialized Europe’ but ‘imagining whether there were other 
paths to similar results’ (p267).  That is, neither reference nor comparative 
situation are stable, each is open to alteration, reshaping, making different 
turning points, and reacting differently to events and to situations.  The 
flexibility on both parts of the clause at the same time, does not deserve the 
status of thinking in cases for it does not offer the kind of necessarily bounded 
accounts of the actual and counterfactual imagined worlds that would look like 
cases.   
 
Nevertheless there are counterfactual examples that rely on the comparison of 
cases, one actual, one counterfactual.  Robert Fogel’s (1964) famous 
counterfactual asked: If there were no railroads, what would have happened to 
American economic growth in the 19th century?  He offered a well-specified 
counter-factual state of ‘If no railroads’, that then remained stable throughout 
his study, and defined in what respect the implications of that counterfactual 
world state were to be questioned: ‘What would have happened to economic 
growth?’.  His answer developed an account of alternative transport routes for 
agricultural goods (assuming that there were no railroads) that entailed 
designing a set of waterway improvements and canals that could have been built 
in order to enable almost the same geographical spread of agriculture over a 
fixed time period.  There were many ways of creating the counterfactual world 
following his ‘If Not p’ and the disciplinary community criticised him roundly for 
his detailed choices.  But the point for this argument here is that he followed 
the ‘minimum rewrite rules’ (Hawthorn, 1991) to create a limited and carefully 
thought-through, alternative, ‘empirical’ imagined world in his ‘Then What?’, 
which could be compared with the existing non-counterfactual empirical world 
case 
21 
 
5.2 Analogical Cases  
The key comparisons of both comparative and counterfactual history rely on 
attention to the differences more than the similarities, but the reverse is so in 
the use of cases in some parts of sociology where the processes and point of 
comparison are understood very differently.  In Howard Becker’s (2014) 
programmatic account of ‘reasoning from cases’, the notion of a case is quite 
elastic.  It is still self-contained but it can refer to a full blown sociological case 
study such as he would do himself, or it could be as slight as an anecdote 
overheard or told him.  While Becker found anecdotes a fertile potential for his 
own case work, Max Gluckman (1961) counted such little anecdotes or vignettes 
only as ‘apt illustrations’ for use within his ‘extended case study method’.  This 
latter method, developed and practised in the Manchester School of social 
anthropology, sits more or less in the same space as Geertz as far as this account 
of reasoning in cases is concerned.  Extended case work (over a long period of 
time either by direct participation or by using the work of others in that same 
field for other times) provided the kinds of insight that would lead to some more 
general account of the society of that field, but for Gluckman as for Geertz (and 
unlike Whyte and Becker) those findings would not have any obvious 
generalisability.12 
 
Becker was not concerned with Bloch’s systematic comparison of similarities and 
differences in order to develop deeper, or more secure, or even new, knowledge 
about two separate cases.  Becker called his mode of reasoning from cases 
‘analogical reasoning’, because he relied on recognising in a second (or third or 
fourth case) a sociologically salient phenomena that he had found in a previous 
case, or even recognised in an anecdote.  That is, he picked out analogous cases 
by his recognition of similarity.13  One of his examples stemmed from his own 
                                                          
12 See Gluckman (1961), reprinted with other essays and commentaries in Evens and 
Handelman, 2006. 
13 His mode was close to Hesse’s (1963) argument for picking out relevant models in her work on 
analogical reasoning, but did not follow her mode of reasoning with the analogy (which depended 
on distinguishing positive from negative features between the comparative cases).  
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experience of the importance of having a despachante (‘a fixer’ - someone who can 
get things done in the social system) in order to get certain documents in order to 
leave Brazil.  He recognised something similar in the role played by an older 
woman who served as the expert for a community of poor black Americans in 
Chicago who needed help in their interactions with the ‘system’ (that is, with 
government agencies and so forth).  Analogical reasoning from cases for Becker 
meant recognising something in common, something generic in sociological terms 
in what might be - for all other intents and purposes - the activities and 
arrangements of people within societies of otherwise widely different times, 
places, and cultures.    
 
Becker’s argument here suggests ‘Given p here, and If you find a version of p 
there? then look for that same, potentially generic phenomenon in several other 
places?’.  This p could be a social figure, a social phenomena, or something more 
abstract.  The analogical move invites the social scientist to extract something 
from one case to look for matching appearances or occurrences in other cases, in 
some ways similar to the use of cases in common law.14  
 
 
6. Thinking in Cases - Again  
When Forrester put the question of ‘thinking in cases’ on the map, recall (from 
section 1) he did so in a way which suggested it should be type seven in 
Crombie’s categories of thinking, understood by Hacking as modes of practical 
reasoning in the sciences. Their six categories are attractive precisely because 
they have both an historical reality, and offer a philosophically informed account 
of doing and reasoning under those headings that scientists have developed over 
the centuries.  These ways of reasoning are not philosophically defined ways of 
reasoning (induction, deduction, counterfactual thinking, etc) but the acceptable 
modes of doing science that scientific communities have adopted to find 
                                                          
14 Forester understood the process of common law case work as proceeded by a process of analogy 
(see his 2017, 128-9). 
23 
 
justifiable knowledge.  And as Hacking pointed out: there is no appeal to any 
philosophical rule of approval that fits over them.  For both Crombie and 
Hacking, theirs was a cut through the way science goes on which helps us to 
understand its variety of approaches to gaining reliable knowledge about the 
world.   
 
But while Forrester put the category of thinking in cases on the map, he did not 
fill in its characteristics as a generic mode of scientific reasoning in the way that 
Hacking later filled in such characterisations for some of the other kinds in his 
list (eg the experimental mode, the statistical mode, classification and taxonomy, 
etc).  Case-based thinking or reasoning is not just a technique or tool any more 
than experiment or statistics or classification are; rather, they are all ways of 
approaching certain kinds of materials with associated methods of reasoning 
found in particular sites of science.  The final section of this paper draws on my 
discussions above of the various ways case-based thinking and reasoning go on to 
offer a characterisation of this seventh mode of reasoning in the sciences.  These 
characterisations suggest the range and limits of case-based reasoning that 
scientists have taken to be allowable in order to create reliable case-based 
knowledge in their fields.  
 
As we have seen, some examples of case thinking have exhibited degrees of 
overlap with Hacking/Crombie’s other modes of reasoning.  Just because there 
are overlaps between case usage with the mathematical form of hypothesis and 
proof, and with the classifying type, does not mean that we don’t need this 
separate category of reasoning.   Just because cases in medicine are associated 
with defining new diseases, and figuring out what kinds of disease is present and 
what class of treatment is appropriate does not mean that all case thinking is 
classificatory (nor that all medical thinking is case-based), but rather that there 
are some hybrids at work.15 Just because some mathematical proof-making 
                                                          
15 For a discussion of the overlapping of cases and classification, see also Linstrum (2019). 
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involved the stacking up of cases or the use of a sequence of cases does not make 
mathematical work all case based or v.v..  Only if we could umbrella all our 
examples under the other styles of thinking or reasoning, could we say we don’t 
need ‘thinking in cases’.  Since we cannot do so, we do need this type no. 7.  
 
Even so, judging by our site discussions, we might question: Is reasoning 
within/with/from cases one kind of thing, or is it lots of things?  We might judge 
that what counts as a case in different fields is so different or has such different 
implications, that the modes of reasoning with cases are disciplinary specific.  
For example Fogel’s world without railways and the proofs in Greek geometry 
might have involved, sequentially, both inductive and then deductive reasoning 
chains, although the nature of the cases at each site and their reasoning 
processes look difficult to align.  It might be that arguing with cases in 
mathematics is always going to look different from arguing, say, with cases in 
sociology.  Thinking in cases may appear discipline specific, most probably 
because different traditions have evolved in different fields.  But at the same 
time, the co-incidences in reasoning, and the similarities between different fields, 
suggests these differences may not be irreducible.  
 
First, while the category of a ‘case’ exhibits considerable variation it has some 
features in common. The three roots Forrester suggests (in section 1 above) are 
only partially helpful.  But if we take them along with our examples, we arrive 
not so much at a definition of a case, but at the characteristics of cases that 
enable us to understand the nature of these chunks of scientific materials.16  
From the mathematical examples, and Mill, we gain the sense of the case as a 
particular instance, whether it be one very small point in a geometry argument 
which might be not so different from the point next door, or whether it is 
something bigger, a particular kind of polyhedra in Lakatos’s framing that is 
different in certain particulars from all the others.  For Becker and Gluckman, 
                                                          
16 For a broader definition of what counts as a case in the social sciences, see Morgan 2012. 
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the sociologists, we saw that the case could be anything from a small anecdote to 
a full blown or ‘extended’ case study.  Whether it was one or the other, it was 
characterised again as a particular, and significantly, each case potentially held 
its own set of descriptors.  That is because, for the most part, these case objects 
were determinedly empirically constructed (though Becker argued a case could 
be an imagined one), with descriptions of great density out of many varying 
elements in order to provide an analytical account for each case.  And from the 
contrast of Fogel with Pomeranz, we reinforced the nature of the case not just as 
defined by particular instances, situations, or events (real or imaginary), but the 
case as a bounded object.   
 
Second, the kinds of reasoning associated with case work and how case-based 
knowledge is made are - again - also varied and here the possibilities of coming 
to a common stance are more problematic.  From the medical diagnostic 
accounts, and from Forrester’s and Geertz’s accounts, we learnt the importance 
of creating coherence: all the disparate elements of description and evidence 
need to be pulled together into a coherent account for reasoning within the case.  
But for Becker and from Bloch, insight came not so much from coherence within 
the individual case account, but from the similarities and differences that 
emerged in the comparison of particulars between cases.  For Bloch, comparison 
of differences between the cases was valid in its own terms to illuminate both 
cases via reciprocal insight, not for anything more general.  In contrast, for 
Becker, careful attention to the comparison of similarities in cases lead to 
something more generic.  This depended upon the sociologist recognising, by 
analogy, common elements amongst otherwise very disparate events or 
situations found in the cases. For runs, series, and sequences of cases, 
similarities formed the basis for something more generic as the outcome of case-
based thinking.  In contrast, for Forrester, commenting on Stoller, for Znaniecki 
on case inductions, or for Ober on the Athens case, and for Morgan on Whyte’s 
social anthropology of a slum, a scientist’s careful and developed analysis of an 
individual case could create the abstract or conceptual materials (as well as more 
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empirical insights or methods) that could be taken beyond the particular case to 
be used more widely in their respective research communities.  Despite this 
variety of reasoning modes, it is surely indicative that many disciplines share the 
view that some form of case-based reasoning is an essential practice within their 
scientific tool-box.   
  
What then, holds these different versions of ‘thinking in cases’ together? 
Forrester’s phrase ‘If p, Then What?’ needs careful attention - in particular, the 
placement of question marks in the way scientists reason in their use of cases is 
critical to understanding, and appreciating, the full range of variations in case-
based enquiry within the human and social sciences.  Those differences in the 
format of ‘If p? Then What?’ illuminate how case-based thinking can cover such a 
wide range of fields and kinds of enquiry.  They alert us to the different kinds of 
reasoning that are involved in creating reliable knowledge from using individual 
cases, from runs of cases, and from case comparisons.  They also make us aware 
of, and look out for, the differences between thinking within or in, thinking with, 
and thinking from or beyond cases.  Different human/social sciences use cases 
for different domains of inference within and beyond the case, but they are all 
fundamentally some kind of bottom up - and often comparative - form of 
reasoning, inductive projects that are used predominantly in the domains of 
discovery rather than those of justification.  But, at the same time, the framing 
Forrester has offered: ‘If p, Then What?’, asks for, and points to a deductive 
stance, regardless of where the question marks fall.17 This inductive-deductive-
comparative mix is one of the great difficulties for philosophers of science 
seeking to characterise a single mode of thinking in cases; but that same mix is 
the source of their charm for the many scientists and humanists who think in 
cases.   
  
                                                          
17 Flexer (2019), argues that the base form of reasoning here is abductive not deductive; case-
work however appears to depend on the maintenance of rich materials during the reasoning 
process rather than reducted materials and inference to the best explanation.   
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Scientists know well that you cannot prove things with cases, and that cases 
don’t produce generalised knowledge.18 Cases are far more useful: they provide 
some of the base level particulars of our knowledge on which other scientific 
work depends; they provide the bits and pieces of scientific knowledge which feed 
into many bigger projects; they can produce generic materials which prove 
salient across wider terrains, and sometimes even develop grander claims 
directly.    
 
  
                                                          
18 In this respect, reasoning with cases is not so different from other modes of doing science 
marked by Hacking and Crombie.  Neither a single experiment, nor a single classificatory 
exercise, nor a single modelling exercise, enable generalisation; all such individual results have 
to be made to travel to other sites and be re-situated there to contribute to more general findings 
(see Morgan 2014). 
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